Introduction
Protecting endangered species is an expensive preoccupation. While the opportunity cost of conserving habitat may be very high (and could escalate further as the human population in the vicinity of protected areas increases), protecting animals from poaching involves substantial additional costs. Recent estimates of the amounts required to prevent poaching range from US$200 to $500 per hectare in Africa (e.g., Parker and Graham 1989 , Simmons and Kreuter 1989 , Burton 2000 , and far exceed actual expenditures on enforcement (e.g., Dublin et al. 1995) . Since many of the world's threatened high-profile species are found in developing countries with limited resources and tight budget constraints (e.g. tigers in Asia, elephants and rhinos in Africa and India, pandas in China), it is not surprising that actual enforcement expenditures lag behind recommended rates. As a result, many species suffer from intense poaching pressure.
Given these difficulties, conservationists have looked for alternative ways to conserve wildlife. Economists have proposed one consistent set of recommendations, which flow naturally from first principles in economics. Rather than trying to keep poachers out of protected areas at enormous costs (driving up prices on black markets, thus increasing the poacher's incentive to hunt), alternative "supply-side" policies have been proposed. Stated simply, the recommendation is to flood the market for wildlife commodities with captive-bred varieties and other alternatives. This will depress prices, and make poaching unprofitable. Poachers will search for alternative employment allowing wild populations of endangered species to recover. The supply side solution appears to have gained considerable popular support. For example, an influential publication provocatively asserts: "If the global captive population of tigers were managed like a cash crop… in no time the domestic tiger would be an important economic resource and poaching wild tigers would be about as profitable as hunting for hen eggs in the jungle" (Asiaweek 1993).
Captive breeding has been recommended as a way to ensure a steady supply of bear bile, tiger bones and rhino horn, thus protecting wild bears (Mills et al. 1995) , tigers (Siedensticker et al. 2000) and black rhinos (Brown and Layton 2001) . Similar policies have been recommended to curb the buoyant illegal trade in live endangered species such as birds and reptiles (Commonwealth of Australia 1998). There are at least two alternative ways to generate additional supplies and lower wildlife prices.
First, prices can be depressed by developing close substitutes for commodities obtained from the wild. This seems especially relevant for species that are primarily hunted for their pharmo-chemical properties, such as animals harvested for traditional Oriental medicine. Substitutes may originate from chemical sources or from other animals that are more plentiful such as rabbits, pigs and hedgehogs (Gu et al. 1994 , Mills et al. 1995 . Second, as a possible temporary solution, prices may be lowered by sales from stockpiles. Kremer and Morcom (2000) , for example, have proposed the use of stockpiled ivory as an instrument to manipulate poaching intensity, and Brown and Layton (2001) describe how sales of stockpiled rhino horn might help address poaching of black rhinos. 1 For the analysis that follows, it does not matter which type of policy is considered. Since trade in most endangered species is either regulated or banned by 1 A possible alternative approach may be to influence demand for wildlife commodities, through publicity campaigns. It is often argued that burning stockpiled ivory by Kenyan president Moi in 1989 had a profound effect on demand for ivory (e.g., Chadwick 1992) . Similarly, Mills et al. (1995: 23) write that bile milking from live bears is now prohibited in South Korea because there was a "public outcry about the inhumane treatment of farm bears after a Korean television network aired a news story showing bile milking." Finally, Crabbe and van Long (1993) also consider deterrence of entry by poachers. They model interaction between a forward looking government and myopic poachers 'sharing' access to a resource stock, where interaction is through the in situ stock (rather than the price, as suggested by the "supply side" hypothesis). Under some conditions, governments may 'drive out' poachers by depressing the resource stock (affecting marginal harvest cost of poachers). From a conservation-perspective, however, such an excessive harvesting strategy is unattractive. CITES, 2 a key decision common to all approaches is whether segments of the (international) trade in commodities should be legalized so that the legal trade can crowd out the illegal trade. For concreteness the discussion is cast in terms of poaching and captive-breeding, but we believe the results are sufficiently general to spill over to the other cases as well.
To our knowledge, the "supply side" approach to conservation has not been subjected to close scrutiny. Moreover, conservationists appear to be reluctant to adopt these policies without further analysis. In light of the uncertainties that surround this issue, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate the prospects of "supply-side" policies for conservation. We argue that the basic premises of the simple model ignore important elements, and demonstrate that there are circumstances in which these policies are counterproductive. Specifically, assumptions with respect to demand (preferences for wildlife commodities), the institutional framework and responses of commodity traders seem overly simplistic.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the conventional model and discuss its implicit assumptions. In section 3 we extend the basic model by introducing considerations pertaining to imperfect competition. In sections 4 and 5 we discuss the implications of captive breeding in this context, and discuss the conditions under which the "supply side" approach is likely to succeed or fail. In section 6 we discuss the form of competition that might arise on wildlife commodity markets, and discuss implications for policy. Section 7 applies the theory to the case of rhino farming. The conclusions and policy implications ensue.
The Simple Model and Some Caveats

The Basic Poaching Model
In this section we sketch the basic model spurring the optimistic belief that supply side policies can contribute to conservation of endangered species. The model is based on the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply of "poachers", harvesting an animal population under conditions of open access (e.g., Berck and Perloff 1984 , Bulte and van Kooten 1999 , Wilen 2000 . Individual poachers do not have property rights to the resource, and typically act as static optimizers. Entry in the "poaching sector" takes place as long as the returns to poaching exceed the returns to effort elsewhere in the economy, and exit occurs when the reverse is true.
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Assume that the marginal cost of poaching effort increases in effort. This may occur, for example, if poachers have to be attracted from other increasingly profitable alternative occupations. Denoting U as the net payoff from poaching for the marginal poacher, the dynamics of aggregate poaching effort E are defined as (suppressing time notation):
where η is an adjustment parameter; s is the net price received by poachers per unit harvested; q is the total quantity harvested; and W>0 and φ>1 are cost parameters.
Without loss of generality we assume φ=2 in what follows.
In conventional poaching studies harvesting is typically described by a Schaefer production function, q=σxE, where σ is the "catchability coefficient" and x represents the wildlife stock (e.g. Clark 1990). Assuming that biological growth of the resource is described by a logistic growth function, the dynamic system is banned outright (Appendix 1). 3 See Bulte and Horan (2002) for a model where the poaching and the alternative activity (say, farming) are ecologically and economically interconnected.
complemented by the following differential equation:
where g(x) describes the biological growth of the resource, r is the intrinsic growth rate and k is the carrying capacity. The steady state of the dynamic system is at the intersection of the dE/dt=0 isocline and the dx/dt=0 isocline in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Steady state poaching effort and wildlife stocks.
The steady state population of the endangered species is defined as:
where w=2W. Observe that dx * /ds < 0. This is also evident from Figure 1 .
Decreasing the price for the poached commodity s rotates the dE/dt=0 isocline downwards. 4 As a consequence, the steady state effort level declines and the steady state wildlife stock rises. Stated simply, the result is fewer people chasing more 4 In a more complete model, the benefits of poaching may be defined s-θF, where θ is the probability of being caught (and convicted) and F is the penalty for poaching if convicted (e.g., Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992) . In such a model, increasing the probability of conviction θ or the expected penalty F has a similar effect as depressing the commodity price s. Increasing θ or F is the currently predominant approach to conservation. In some parts of Africa, the penalty for poaching elephants and rhinos may be as severe as the risk of being shot. animals.
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Two Implicit but Important Assumptions
The reasoning is incomplete as it rests on two implicit assumptions that are at odds with reality. First, it is assumed that those involved in the wildlife trade are price takers. While this is obviously true for poachers in the field, it is not true for those governing the trade in the goods. There is overwhelming evidence that the illegal trade in endangered species and wildlife commodities is controlled by a small number of highly organized and often criminal groups (e.g., Meacham 1997 , Galster et al. 1994 , Galster and Eliot 2000 , WPSI 2001 , Commonwealth of Australia 1998). The traders act as an intermediate agent between poachers and consumers or retailers, setting prices for poachers and determining the quantities to release on the market.
Such criminal networks possibly exploit economics-of-scale in smuggling as the illegal trade in wildlife is often accompanied by trade in narcotics, arms, and people (WPSI 2001 , Galster et al. 1994 . The evidence therefore suggests that markets for wildlife commodities are characterized by imperfect competition, possibly giving rise to strategic behavior. 6 Second, it is conventionally assumed that suppliers of wildlife commodities face a stationary downward sloping demand function along which the additional supply of captive-bred products will depress prices. There are a number of reasons to doubt the validity of this assumption. First, much of the international trade in wildlife 5 The effect on harvesting in the steady state is ambiguous. Harvesting would be ambiguously affected even if both effort and stocks went up (or down). This is due to the backward bending supply curve that is implied by the logistic growth function (Clark 1990) . If the initial steady state is on the downward sloping segment of the growth function (i.e, for x*>k/2), smaller stocks support larger equilibrium harvest levels. 6 When access to the resource is open to other (criminal) groups, the incumbent trader may be able to deter entry of other criminal groups by strategic reductions of the common stock (Mason and Polasky 1994) . It is uncertain whether such pre-emptive harvesting is relevant for the endangered species context that we study here, and in what follows we ignore such motivations. commodities is regulated by CITES. While these trade restrictions are circumvented on a routine basis by criminal networks, there is evidence that smuggling is easier when illegal supplies may be 'laundered' and sold under the cover of legal supplies (Khanna and Harford 1996) . Legal trade may thus facilitate illegal trade because poached commodities from the wild may be passed off as legal supplies from farms or stores. This potential problem is one of the main reasons why the ivory trade ban is still in place, even though in parts of Africa elephant densities exceed environmentally sustainable levels. Conservationists are concerned that poached ivory from, say, Eastern Africa or Asia may be sold under the cover of legal ivory originating in Southern Africa where elephants are plentiful (Dobson and Poole 1992) .
If laundering occurs, it will lower the transaction costs for trading illegal commodities and may thus increase market penetration. There are additional effects of captive breeding that warrant mentioning. Legal supplies from captive-bred animals may send a (false) signal to consumers that the species in question is no longer endangered, or that consumption of the product has no adverse environmental impacts. Legal supplies may also lower the social and legal sanctions for consuming wildlife products (e.g., Nowell 2000) . As a result, potential consumers that hitherto refrained from purchasing wildlife commodities may enter the market, effectively increasing overall demand (Highley and Highley 1994, Servheen 1995) . Furthermore, as noted by Meacham (1997) , commodities from the wild and farms are unlikely to be perfect substitutes. This is evident, for example, in the case of bear bile and tiger bones. It is suggested that consumers of these products perceive farmed substitutes as lacking the potency of the wild products, and that consumption of the farmed variety eventually stimulates demand for the authentic wild product (a "stepping stone" argument).
In the analysis below we will focus on the former assumption and analyze the implications of imperfect competition. The remaining effects (laundering effect and changing consumer preferences) are captured by assuming that the inverse demand curve for wildlife commodities may shift as a result of captive breeding. Hence, given a level of supply, the "net" price that the traders receive (that is, the market price minus transaction costs) might increase.
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The resulting ambiguous effect on residual demand for commodities from the wild is consistent with actual experience of captive breeding. For example, Meacham (1997:169) argues the laundering effect has caused the (near) extinction of the wild crocodile in Thailand. "There was a wild crocodile population in Thailand once, but it virtually ceased to exist within a few years of the crocodile farms starting." In contrast, according to Mills et al. (1995) widespread bear farming in China has stabilized Chinese prices for bear bile, while prices have increased substantially elsewhere in Asia.
An Imperfect Competition Model
Recent investigations suggest that the illegal trade in wild animal products is controlled by a relatively small number of cartelised traders, while poaching and trapping are carried out by subsistence forest dwellers under open access conditions. We characterise this situation be developing a stylised three-stage game. In the first stage the traders of wild animal products set the remuneration to be paid to poachers.
In the following stage the poachers determine the harvest of wild animals, taking as given the prices set by the traders. In the final stage the traders sell the wild animal 7 While this assumption is convenient and logical for the case of changing consumer preferences, the "laundering effect" is more naturally captured by assuming that the marginal costs curve (supply curve) has shifted out. However, since the qualitative results are identical, we simplify the exposition by assuming that all effects may be combined into the shifting (inverse) demand curve. products to consumers. For the second stage in the game, the base model presented above is directly applicable.
For analytical tractability the results are based on two important simplifying assumptions. First, we adopt the stylised assumption of competition between a single wildlife trader and farmer. The case of imperfect competition on the market for illegal commodities is well-documented and has been briefly discussed above. More surprising, perhaps, is evidence that captive-breeding of some species is also subject to increasing returns to scale (be it through fixed costs, informational asymmetries or regulation). For instance, Mills et al. (1995) note that the entire Chinese market (10,000 bears producing some 10,000 kg of bile) is served by no more than 7 bear farms. We distinguish cases where competition in the retail markets involves price setting (Bertrand competition) and quantity setting (Cournot competition) by the two suppliers. While the assumption of duopolistic competition may seem far-fetched, it is well known that the qualitative results apply more generally to situations where the trade is controlled by a small number of agents (e.g., Tirole 1988) . A necessary condition for the results in this paper to hold is that trade in wild animal products generates positive profits--a condition that is satisfied in reality. In the second stage the poachers determine the harvest of wild animals, taking as trade more precise estimates are unavailable. Mills et al. (1995) report that captive breeding of bears is also a profitable activity, generating rates of return in the range of 70%-90%.
given the remuneration rate set by traders. 
The corresponding harvest of wild animals for a given s is:
To ensure that the harvest of wild animals is sufficient to meet the needs of the traders, the remuneration paid to poachers must satisfy the condition:
Equating equations (7) and (9) and solving yields the equilibrium remuneration paid to poachers:
Finally, using (9) the equilibrium harvest of wild animals when there is no captivebreeding program is defined by
Assuming an interior steady state exists, it may be found numerically by equating the optimal harvest with natural growth: q M =g(x). Note that this implies solving a third order polynomial when g(x) is a logistic function. We return to this issue below.
Captive Breeding and Conservation
Demand Functions
When captive-bred animal products are introduced to the market, the inverse demand for poached wild animals is modified to:
where q F is the supply of captive bred farmed animal products and q w is the supply of commodities from the wild. To ensure positive output levels over some ranges it is
Observe that γ is a measure of the degree of substitutability between the products. When γ=β i the goods are perfect substitutes.
We assume γ ≤ β i (i=w,F), so that the own price effects on demand are no less than the cross price effects. Analogously, the inverse demand for farmed animal products is:
Rearranging (12) and (13), the direct demand functions may be expressed as: 
) for i=w,F and i≠j.
9 Note that this is the same equilibrium outcome that eventuates when traders set s (instead of q w ) in the final stage of the game to maximize profits taking account of the optimum response in (9). 10 If this condition is not satisfied the downstream equilibrium may be unstable (see, e.g. Shapiro 1988) .
Quantity Competition in the Retail Market
We begin by considering the effects of Cournot (i.e. quantity setting) competition between the farm sector and the traders in the final stage of the game. The farm sector's and wildlife trader's payoff functions are given by, respectively:
where v denotes production costs of captive breeding. Under Cournot competition each supplier sets output levels, taking its rival's output as given. Differentiating (16) with respect to own output (q Solving (17), output levels for a given s are:
Substituting (18) in (16) gives the Cournot reduced form profit function for w:
The trader sets the level of remuneration (s) paid to poachers to maximize (19) subject to the condition that
Equating (9) and (18), the optimal remuneration under Cournot competition is: 
The following Lemma compares poaching levels before and after the introduction of captive breeding, when the parameters of the demand function are held constant. All proofs are in Appendix A. 
Intuitively, under Cournot competition each firm maximizes profits taking as given its rival's output. Thus, compared with the monopoly case, the introduction of a substitute product lowers the (residual) demand for wild animal parts. Specifically, from (12), the intercept of inverse demand following the introduction of a substitute product is given by α m -γq F . Thus, the market share and profitability of wild animal trading decline and poaching levels fall. Lemma 1a suggests that greater competition in the market for wild animal products will have the desired effect of reducing poaching levels. To assess the generality of this conclusion it is clearly necessary to determine whether these results continue to hold when competition occurs through price setting.
Price Competition in the Retail Market
Consider next the case when competitors in the retail market set prices (i.e. there is Bertrand competition with differentiated products). Using the direct demand function in (15), the farmer's and trader's payoff functions are given by, respectively: 
Solving (24) for a given s the equilibrium prices are: Substituting (25) and (26) into the demand function for w: The intuition for this result is the following. In the absence of captive breeding the trader, as monopolist, maximizes profits by restricting supply. In contrast, when players compete by setting prices there is intense competition in the market, inducing an expansion in output levels and a consequent increase in poaching levels. This finding therefore suggests that if captive breeding results in aggressive competition in the retail market, it will increase poaching levels and may therefore be counterproductive. It appears that this facet of competition has been overlooked in proposals to introduce captive breeding programs. 
Steady states of the myopic Cournot and Bertrand models
In this section we consider the interaction between myopic harvesting and stock regeneration. Assuming that the initial stock corresponds with the monopolist's steady state as discussed in section 3, does captive breeding promote or undermine
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The equilibrium level of s is determined by the condition that the demand for q w at prices determined in (29) must equal supply as determined by the poachers in equation (11). 13 It is useful to compare the effects of product differentiation on Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. Mills et al. (1995) suggest that bile from farmed bears (and even animal biles from different species) has gained greater acceptance over the last decade. In our specification of demand, the term γ measures the degree of product differentiation. By inspection of (22) and (27), note that as γ→0, the demands become more independent so that (in the extreme case of independent goods the outcome converges to the monopoly equilibrium derived in section 3). Thus, as the degree of substitutability increases, as appears to have occurred with bear bile (Mills et al. 1995) , the effects of strategic interaction will become more pronounced over time.
long-run wildlife abundance? To answer this question, we first need to explore how many steady states may exist in the long run. Note that (11), (22) and (27) define harvest functions q that are increasing and concave in stocks (x), and start from the origin (x=0, q=0). The growth function g(x) is also concave starting from the origin.
We distinguish between 2 cases. For x→0, it may hold that q′(x)>g′(x), or it may the case that q′(x)<g′(x). Note that if the reduced form harvest function q intersects the growth curve g(x) from below (above), the resulting steady state is stable (unstable) (see May (1974) ).
If q′(x)>g′(x), the harvest function is steeper than the growth function for low value of x (as may be the case with slow-growing species). There may be (i) no If, on the other hand, q′(x)<g′(x), the growth function is steeper than the harvest function for low value of x (as may be the case with fast-growing species).
Depending on the parameters, there may be (iv) a single equilibrium, (v) a steady state and a bifurcation point, and (vi) three interior equilibria. The latter case is illustrated in Figure 3 . Note there are three possibilities, as q now (vi-a) first cuts g(x) from below (stable, x<k/2), next (vi-b) q(x) cuts g(x) from above (unstable, x<k/2, compare to steady state A in Figure 2 ), and finally (vi-c) q(x) cuts g(x) from below (stable, x>k/2, compare to B in Figure 2 ). For additional details, refer to May (1974) .
vi-a vi-b vi-c
Fig.3: An example with 3 equilibria (vi-a and vi-c are stable, and vi-b is unstable).
Our main results with respect to long-run wildlife abundance and captive breeding are summarized in Proposition 3. 
) Thus, in equilibrium the direct effects outweigh the indirect effects. This suggests that when stocks fall, even though the remuneration s increases, overall poaching levels will decline. As a result, a new steady state at a lower level of wildlife abundance will emerge if the steady state is stable, as is the case in point C, Figure 2 . This qualitative result also holds for additional stable equilibria that might exist on the upward sloping part of the growth function.
Because the growth function is non-monotone in wildlife abundance x the impact of captive breeding on equilibrium harvest level is ambiguous. Whenever the new steady state (D or C in Figure 2 ) lies closer to the peak of the unimodal growth function (x=k/2) than the initial steady state B, the new equilibrium will support a larger flow of output.
Finally, if the initial equilibrium is unstable, a short-term increase in harvesting may trigger extinction (for example, this is true when the system in Figure   2 is initially in point A and then switches to Bertrand competition). Extinction due to "overshooting," however, is also feasible in case the initial equilibrium is stable.
Whether extinction occurs will depend crucially upon the adjustment parameter η in equation (1)--the rate at which poachers leave the poaching sector when poaching yields negative profits (Clark 1990) . While the catch per unit of effort q/E → 0 as x→
0, extinction under conditions of open access is inevitable when "exit" is sufficiently slow (η is sufficiently small--see Bjorndal and Conrad 1987).
Socially Optimal Farming
When captive breeding contributes to conservation it may call for some form of government intervention to ensure optimal supplies of captive-bred animals. To investigate this issue in greater detail we determine the socially optimal level of captive breeding. Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the optimal level of captive breeding will depend on the form of competition between the breeder and the trader.
Assume the government is concerned about revenues and conservation (or in situ abundance of the species in question), and aims to maximize the present value of the following objective function: 
Form of Competition
The analysis in the previous section suggests that the success of supply side polices may hinge critically upon the intensity and form of competition in the retail market.
The issue of whether competition occurs in prices or quantities is perhaps one of the most important unsettled question in Industrial Organization (e.g. Tirole 1988 ). In general it is impossible to predict the choice of competitive instrument that the players will adopt. However, there are certain special conditions under which it may be possible to determine whether the eventual outcome will more closely approximate the Bertrand or the Cournot equilibrium.
Consider the case where the harvest of wild animals is constrained either by biological, or other factors. For example, the growth function may pose a biological constraint.
15
Alternatively, a rapid increase in poaching levels may draw public attention to the problem and induce more intensive and effective protection of wild animal stocks.
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In both these examples the supply of wild animals is limited by exogenous constraints beyond the control of traders. In this section we extend the analysis of Kreps and Schienkman (1983) to the case of differentiated products. It is shown that when one supplier is constrained in the ability to increase output then the outcome will approximate the Cournot equilibrium, even though the players compete by setting prices. Observe that (31) simply defines the optimal Bertrand competition responses in quantity space. The output of the capacity constrained player (w) is then given by:
16 Anecdotal examples abound. For instance the rapid escalation of tiger poaching in Ranthambore National Park in India, drew international media attention to the problem and a consequent increase in anti-poaching effort which led to a gradual recovery of the tiger population (Thapar, 1991) . More recently, poachers in Corbett National Park killed 11 tuskers (elephants) and a forest guard. The escalation in poaching activity has pressured the Indian government to improve policing in the park and provide more effective protection to the tigers and elephants (Wildlife Trust of India, 2001) . 17 There is an alternative way to address this issue, which is not considered in this paper. It is possible to consider the Nash equilibrium that eventuates when players are allowed a free choice of the instruments of competition. If the firms can pre-commit to either competing in prices or quantities, the dominant strategy can be shown to be quantity competition. However, with asymmetric players there exist circumstances under which firms may have an incentive to defect from this strategy. Hence, in the absence of a credible commitment device, it is difficult to rationalize how any agreement with an illegal supplier can be enforced. 18 All the results also apply to the case with a constraint on farm animal production.
Since it is assumed that Thus, for a given output level of the rival, player w sets the market-clearing price at which its constrained output is sold.
Next we show that when w adopts this strategy of selling to capacity at the market-clearing price, it is optimal for the rival to set the Cournot best response to output level w q .
Lemma 3b: If w sets the market-clearing price at which it sells its capacity, then the rival player F maximizes its profits by producing along its Cournot reaction function.
Hence, given w's profit maximizing strategy of selling its constrained output at the market-clearing price, it is optimal for the rival F to set the Cournot output level. A 19 These inequalities can be established by direct comparison of the equilibrium outputs. More generally for given parameters the output levels under Bertrand competition exceed those under Cournot competition (Shapiro 1989) . 20 Recall that w w w c B≤ < . similar argument applies if firm F is output constrained (for example by government regulation). These results therefore imply that if exogenous factors limit supplies sufficiently, the outcome will approximate the Cournot equilibrium. This is an important result for policy makers; while restricting harvests from wild stocks is difficult and expensive, it appears that policy makers can reach their conservation objectives by restricting output from the farming sector instead. This is likely much simpler. While restricting the farming sector's output, policy makers should make sure that farmed output is sufficiently large to have an impact on the trader's output, but at the same time it should be smaller than the Cournot equilibrium. If the government chooses an output constraint that exceeds the Cournot equilibrium, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies under price setting. It is therefore no longer possible to predict the outcome of a captive-breeding program.
Empirical application: rhino farming
In this section we demonstrate the relevance of our analysis by applying the model to the case of rhino poaching and farming. We calibrate the models using data provided by Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams (1992) and Layton (1997, 2001 ).
We have, however, incorporated a few simplifications consistent with the theoretical specifications above. We stress, therefore, that the quantitative results must be considered an approximation. Nevertheless, we believe that the predictions are of interest.
Specifically, we adopt the following three simplifying assumptions. (1) Rhino growth is described by a logistic growth function, as opposed to the skewed growth function common in the ecological literature: g(x)=0.16x(1-x/k) where k=100,000 animals. (2) The (inverse) demand function for rhino horn is assumed linear--we have fitted a line through the price-quantity observations provided by Brown and Layton (2001) , yielding p(q)=6182 -2.13q, where q is the number of rhinos supplied and where every rhino carries 3 kilograms of horn. In the absence of any data on substitutability, we have arbitrarily set γ=0.75. (3) We have set the poaching cost parameter w so that the no-farming model yields a steady state that is roughly comparable to the current population of rhinos. 21 Recent evidence suggests that the wild population of rhinos is not being over-harvested to extinction, but rather that the population stabilizes at the historically low level of about 2600 animals, see Dublin and Wilson (1998) . Finally, with respect to farming costs we use the dehorning costs data provided by Brown and Layton.
We have solved the models, and summarize representative results in Table 1 : The numerical results suggest that the no-farming and Bertrand model display 3 equilibria, two of which are stable, (case vi in section 5) while the Cournot model has a single stable equilibrium (case iv). Table 2 suggests that captive breeding may have dramatic implications for rhino abundance. If the trader and farmer engage in Bertrand competition, the increase in short-term harvesting reduces the wild rhino population, and the system does not reach a new equilibrium until the wild stock has declined by about 50%. Clearly, for a species so close to minimum viable population 21 Analyzing poaching in a region in Zambia, Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams assume that poaching costs are proportional to the number of expeditions. Our specification assumes increasing marginal costs. If we calibrate our specification using the micro-data provided by Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams, we obtain a value of w that is very close to the one used in the numerical model. The qualitative results are unaffected if we use this parameter instead.
levels (e.g., Soulé 1987), such a collapse might significantly jeopardize its viability and survival prospects.
On the other hand, if the trader and farmer engage in Cournot competition, the "low" stable equilibrium vanishes, and the rhino population would make a dramatic recovery to near carrying capacity levels (92,900 animals), likely rendering captive rhino breeding into one of the largest conservation successes of all times. The form of competition thus dramatically affects the harvest level, shifting steady states as discussed above, but it may also trigger discontinuous jumps from one steady state to another. We believe the numerical results for the case of rhino poaching and breeding clearly demonstrate that the behavioral underpinnings of wildlife markets should be of the utmost importance to policy makers--there is a lot to win or lose. But without sufficient understanding of the market, it is extremely hard to predict what outcome might emerge.
Discussion and Conclusions
While strategic trade theories have gained a firm foothold in environmental economics since the mid-1990s (e.g., Barrett 1994 , Ulph 1996 , similar analyses have not been widely conducted in renewable resource economics. Perhaps this reflects the fact that imperfect property rights, free entry and rent dissipation are pervasive problems in renewable resource economics (Wilen 2000) , rendering strategic considerations less important. The simple textbook case of open access, however, neglects important aspects of commercial poaching of wild animals. In reality, the illegal trade in wild animals generates substantial rents that accrue, not to poachers in the field, but further up the supply hierarchy to criminal networks specialized in trafficking illegal commodities across borders.
Imperfect competition thus is also at the heart of commercial endangered species poaching, and failure to acknowledge this fact could have detrimental consequences for wildlife. This realization is particularly important now that growing dissatisfaction with the conventional protectionist approach to conservation has prompted calls for the adoption of supply side policies. This paper has highlighted the potential dangers of introducing such policies without carefully scrutinising the microeconomic structure of the market, the strategic interaction between the market participants and dynamic effects on resource stocks. Price setting in an oligopolistic market is often interpreted as representative of a market with intense competition (Tirole 1988) . The analysis reveals that captive breeding may be detrimental if it induces aggressive competition, since this drives output levels towards the perfectly competitive outcome. The picture becomes more complex when we allow for the possibility that consumer preferences are likely unstable and that transaction costs of illegal trade are affected when a parallel legal trade develops.
It is perhaps useful to note that the qualitative results are unaffected if the farming sector is perfectly competitive.
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If traders earns excess profits and use prices as the strategic variable, then the trader's best response to a lower price set by a rival is also to lower its own price. This in turn necessitates an increase in wild supplies.
On the other hand, if traders compete using quantities as the strategic variable, greater competition from rivals lowers the trader's residual demand curve and thus induces a fall in output levels. Thus what is critical for the results to hold is that there are excess profits earned in the wildlife trade. The existing (albeit) anecdotal evidence 22 Hoel (1978) analyzes the case where a monopolist controls extraction of an (exhaustible) resource but faces a substitute supplied under conditions of perfect competition. Hoel demonstrates that resource extraction of the monopolist is ambiguously affected by a competitively supplied substitute, depending on the production cost of the substitute relative to the initial price charged by a pure monopolist. While Hoel's model lacks an explicit strategic dimension, it offers many handles for strongly suggests that there are substantial rents earned in the trade in some illegal wild commodities. Turning to one of the key simplifications in this paper, we recognize that the assumption that the trader does not care about future payoffs is an extreme one.
While it appears reasonable to assume that tenure insecurity as faced by the trader will translate into higher discount rates, the assumption of an infinite discount rate is clearly a limiting case. With a finite discount rate, an open loop dynamic duopoly model would be appropriate. Note that, unlike most other multiple agent resource models, an open loop solution will be subgame perfect because in the current model there is no interaction via the wildlife stock (the only state variable in the model) and policy makers (e.g., by influencing the substitute's production cost) to manipulate exploitation by the monopolist. We thank Alistair Ulph for pointing this out to us. 23 It may be objected that these rents are purely a reflection of the risk premium required to engage in illegal activities. Again the evidence suggests that this seems unlikely for the trade in some wildlife commodities. For instance, no trader has ever been convicted for dealing in illegal tiger parts and the penalties are low (US$500) compared to the payoffs from the sale of products from each tiger (US$2,500 -10,000) (WPSI, 2001) . Moreover, only two tiger poachers have ever been convicted in India (the main source of tiger bones and organs), despite a flourishing illegal industry in tiger poaching (WTI, 2001) . This suggests that the potential risks of conviction and apprehension are low and hence the required risk premium is likely to be low.
the farmer is a normal profit maximizing firm solving a static optimization problem. 24 One may assume that the trader maximizes the net present value of profits (subject to the equation of motion for the wildlife stock and the farmer's response), and solve for the open loop solution using the maximum principle. For a discussion of features of the open loop equilibrium and the results of a static game, see Mason and Polasky (1997) .
In this situation an augmented "golden rule" that implicitly defines the optimal wildlife stock (jointly with the condition that growth equals harvesting) could readily be derived. A number of other issues have not been addressed in this paper. The strategic interactions analysed in the paper are based on a simultaneous move game between the trader and farmer in the retail market. There remains the possibility that one of the players may have a strategic first-mover advantage in the retail market. It is well established in the literature that with quantity setting competition a Stackelberg leader can limit the output of the follower while, conversely, the leader is at a disadvantage relative to the follower under price competition (Dowrick 1986) 26 . Thus, in a sequential move game the effects of captive breeding on poaching levels will depend on the instruments of competition (i.e. price or quantity competition) and the sequence of moves between the players. In general it is unclear whether a strategic advantage would accrue to traders or breeders. On the one hand, the benefits of incumbency might confer a strategic benefit upon traders. However, it is possible that the legal status of farmed products might give breeders a strategic advantage. Thus the introduction of sequential moves in retailing does little to mitigate the ambiguity identified in the paper. Once again there remains the possibility that captive breeding may either promote or undermine conservation efforts.
Finally, if at any given price all consumers prefer (say) wild products to captive products, then it may be more appropriate to model the goods as being vertically differentiated in product quality space (Tirole 1988 ).
27
The literature on vertical product differentiation suggests that when the quality of goods is given, the higher quality product always captures a larger share of the market (Shaked and Sutton 1983) . But existing data from the Chinese "bear bile market" suggest that the 26 Note also that for some parameters the entry of a follower can be blocked by the leader (Tirole 1988: 323) . 27 There are a priori arguments to suggest that this may not be the case if only some consumers care about the environmental consequences of consuming wild animal products.
perception of farmed commodities relative to harvests from 'the wilds' is subject to a trend. In addition, for reasons of analytical tractability it is necessary to assume the existence of price competition in vertical product differentiation models, implying that qualitative predictions regarding poaching levels are similar to those of Bertrand competition with horizontally differentiated products. It would clearly be useful in future research to investigate whether these conclusions hold under quantity competition. This remains an issue for future research. The rest of the analysis follows as above.
